Theodicy the study of God.
Pre-modern[ edit ] The origins of philosophy of science trace back to Plato and Aristotle  who distinguished the forms of approximate and exact reasoning, set out the threefold scheme of abductivedeductiveThe philosophy of science inductive inference, and also analyzed reasoning by analogy.
The eleventh century Arab polymath Ibn al-Haytham known in Latin as Alhazen conducted his research in optics by way of controlled experimental testing and applied geometryespecially in his investigations into the images resulting from the reflection and refraction of light.
Roger Bacon —an English thinker and experimenter heavily influenced by al-Haytham, is recognized by many to be the father of modern scientific method.
In his work Novum Organum — an allusion to Aristotle's Organon — Bacon outlined a new system of logic to improve upon the old philosophical process of syllogism. Bacon's method relied on experimental histories to eliminate alternative theories.
In this philosophy[,] propositions are deduced from the phenomena and rendered general by induction. The 19th century writings of John Stuart Mill are also considered important in the formation of current conceptions of the scientific method, as well as anticipating later accounts of scientific explanation.
Logical positivism Instrumentalism became popular among physicists around the turn of the 20th century, after which logical positivism defined the field for several decades. Logical positivism accepts only testable statements as meaningful, rejects metaphysical interpretations, and embraces verificationism a set of theories of knowledge that combines logicismempiricismand linguistics to ground philosophy on a basis consistent with examples from the empirical sciences.
Seeking to overhaul all of philosophy and convert it to a new scientific philosophy,  the Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle propounded logical positivism in the late s. Interpreting Ludwig Wittgenstein 's early philosophy of languagelogical positivists identified a verifiability principle or criterion of cognitive meaningfulness.
From Bertrand Russell 's logicism they sought reduction of mathematics to logic. They also embraced Russell's logical atomismErnst Mach 's phenomenalism —whereby the mind knows only actual or potential sensory experience, which is the content of all sciences, whether physics or psychology—and Percy Bridgman 's operationalism.
Thereby, only the verifiable was scientific and cognitively meaningful, whereas the unverifiable was unscientific, cognitively meaningless "pseudostatements"—metaphysical, emotive, or such—not worthy of further review by philosophers, who were newly tasked to organize knowledge rather than develop new knowledge.
Logical positivism is commonly portrayed as taking the extreme position that scientific language should never refer to anything unobservable—even the seemingly core notions of causality, mechanism, and principles—but that is an exaggeration.
Talk of such unobservables could be allowed as metaphorical—direct observations viewed in the abstract—or at worst metaphysical or emotional. Theoretical laws would be reduced to empirical laws, while theoretical terms would garner meaning from observational terms via correspondence rules.
Mathematics in physics would reduce to symbolic logic via logicism, while rational reconstruction would convert ordinary language into standardized equivalents, all networked and united by a logical syntax.
A scientific theory would be stated with its method of verification, whereby a logical calculus or empirical operation could verify its falsity or truth. In the late s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and America.
By then, many had replaced Mach's phenomenalism with Otto Neurath 's physicalismand Rudolf Carnap had sought to replace verification with simply confirmation. With World War II 's close inlogical positivism became milder, logical empiricism, led largely by Carl Hempelin America, who expounded the covering law model of scientific explanation as a way of identifying the logical form of explanations without any reference to the suspect notion of "causation".Willard Van Orman Quine: Philosophy of Science.
V. O. Quine () did not conceive of philosophy as an activity separate from the general province of empirical science. This book was recommended as essential reading to accompany The Teaching Company's course "Philosophy of Science". It covered many .
Detailed article on the history of the 'love of wisdom'. Any serious student attempting to better understand the nature, methods and justification of science will value Alex Rosenberg’s updated and substantially revised Third Edition of Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary benjaminpohle.comg together lucid explanations and clear analyses, the volume is a much-used, thematically oriented introduction to the field.
The philosophy of social science is the study of the logic, methods, and foundations of social sciences such as psychology, economics, and political science. Philosophers of social science are concerned with the differences and similarities between the social and the natural sciences, causal relationships between social phenomena, the possible existence of social laws, and the ontological.
Philosophy, Science and Religion: Science and Philosophy from The University of Edinburgh. Philosophy, Science and Religion mark three of the most fundamental modes of thinking about the world and our place in it.
Are these modes incompatible?.